2024 Election Post-Mortem
My thoughts on GOP gains, ticket splitting, Florida amendments failing, and more...
Welcome all, this is preliminary—California has counted only about half its votes and precinct-level data (critical for pinpointing racial and ethnic shifts) will take more time to be released—it’s still productive to share some early takeaways.
Republican Gains
Before diving into specific trends or notable observations, it’s essential to keep in mind that Trump improved his performance across nearly every demographic and throughout the country compared to 2020.
Nationally, we’re looking at about a 6-point shift in Trump’s favor. For any county or group to show a shift toward Democrats, they would have to ‘trend’ (meaning shift relative to the national average) by at least 7 points toward the Democrats—a substantial shift. Still, examining which groups trended toward Democrats or Republicans is fascinating, as it reveals potential coalitions for future elections, such as in 2026, when the national map may resemble 2020 more closely.
White Voters
Heading into election night, Democrats were hoping to offset minority losses by making gains among white voters, particularly well-educated whites. But that shift didn’t materialize; in fact, white voters swung hard toward Trump.
The only notable exceptions were in historically Republican, well-educated northern suburbs, where Democrats made slight inroads compared to 2020. Areas like Waukesha, WI; Carmel, IN; Overland Park, KS; and Westerville, OH—some of the whitest, most affluent, and best-educated parts of the country—trended 7–10 points toward Democrats. These places are going to come out with a vengeance in 2026, but it will be very interesting to see how blue they get.
More diverse suburbs, like Somerset County, NJ; DuPage County, IL; and Collin and Fort Bend Counties in Texas, were disappointing for Democrats, a stark contrast to their strong performance in these areas over the past decade. While we’re still waiting on precinct-level data for confirmation, it I’m guessing the predominantly white areas remained fairly stable (similar to trends in Carmel and Westerville), while the more diverse precincts, particularly those with Asian and Hispanic populations, showed significant declines for Democrats.
White voters in working-class towns, suburbs, and cities abandoned Democrats en masse. In 2020, Biden managed to stop the bleeding, but 2024 has seen a realignment on par with 2016, with Harris experiencing a sweeping loss among working-class white voters in densely populated areas. Trump flipped Bucks County in Pennsylvania and surged in Macomb County, Michigan.
Democrats suffered major losses among rural white voters. This was especially harmless to Democrats in the general Driftless Area, which hurts Democrats in a battleground state (Wisconsin) and in key congressional districts (WI-03 and IA-01). Many areas swung nearly as far to the right as the nation overall, which is remarkable given that they were already close to Republican saturation. And it wasn’t just about vote share—turnout surged in these areas as well. As I talked about on NewsNation on Thursday, rural voters turned out at a much higher rate than urban voters in 2024 compared to 2020. This was especially noticeable in Pennsylvania and Ohio, where each county did not shift that much towards Republicans but the statewide margin still shifted a lot since Republicans composed a much higher proportion of the electorate.
Hispanic Voters
Hispanic voters shifted dramatically towards Trump for the second consecutive election. Exit polls show that Trump won Hispanic men nationally, a remarkable shift. Miami-Dade went from a Clinton +30 county in 2016 to a Trump +13 county in 2024. Trump flipped Webb, Hidalgo, and Cameron counties in the Rio Grande Valley, as well as every county in California's Central Valley and Inland Empire. His support surged in Hispanic communities in New York City and Chicago. Hispanic voters now appear set to become a lasting part of the Republican coalition and a critical swing voting bloc nationally, much like Catholic voters.
Trump’s coalition in 2016 was overwhelmingly white—about 90% of his supporters were white voters, reflecting his strong appeal among white working-class and rural voters. However, by 2024, the composition of his coalition had significantly diversified, with the share of white voters dropping to around 75%. The share of minority voters in his base has nearly tripled in just eight years, with Hispanic voters playing a major part in this.
Black Voters
Democrats have spent the year worried about Black voters switching to Trump, but in 2024, that concern turned out to be unfounded. While precinct-level data is still needed for precise numbers, Democrats held steady with Black voters overall. In fact, Harris appears to have done slightly better with Black voters than Biden did in 2020, as seen in predominantly Black counties like Coahoma County, MS. Most of the Democratic losses in Philadelphia seem to be from Hispanic voters in the city’s Near Northeast, while in Wayne County, it appears to be from Arab voters.
The real challenge for Democrats with Black voters wasn’t support but turnout. Black voters remain the backbone of the Democratic Party and the most consistent voting bloc in the country for either party. While Pennsylvania’s 29 rural counties saw a 2% increase in votes compared to 2020, Philadelphia’s turnout fell by 5%, with even sharper drops in predominantly Black neighborhoods. Despite Harris’s campaign having virtually unlimited funding for ground operations and turnout drives, the results are sobering for Democrats.
Jewish and Muslim Voters
Ironically, both Jewish and Muslim voters shifted sharply to the right in this election, largely influenced by the Gaza conflict. In Dearborn, Michigan—the largest Arab-American community in the U.S.—Harris’s performance was disastrous (it shifted from Biden+50 to Trump+6 with Jill Stein winning 18% of the vote). In some precincts, Harris even placed third behind Trump and Stein. Interestingly, Stein may have drawn more votes from Trump than from Harris in Dearborn, contrary to expectations.
This shift among Muslim voters makes sense when considering that, while Muslim Americans tend to hold socially conservative views, they have historically leaned Democratic due to a perception of Republican hostility toward Muslims. With many now viewing the Democratic Party’s stance on the Gaza conflict as equally unwelcoming, they gravitated toward Trump as the more conservative option if they didn’t choose Stein.
Meanwhile, Democratic losses among Jewish voters were also significant. Many Jewish Americans, perceiving Republicans as more staunchly “pro-Israel,” turned right as well. In NY-17, Republican Mike Lawler effectively captured the support of swing-voter Jews in the Hudson Valley, and Rockland County saw a pronounced shift toward Trump at the top of the ticket. This dual shift among both Muslim and Jewish voters highlights the unexpected electoral impact of the Gaza conflict across communities with typically different political alignments.
Asian Voters
Asian voters are a growing part of the electorate and have leaned strongly toward Democrats for most of recent history. While we're still awaiting precinct-level data to confirm the trends, preliminary county and district data suggest that Democratic support among Asian voters has significantly declined—almost as much as it has among Hispanic voters. Initial results show that in NY-6, a majority-Asian district in Queens (most notably including Flushing), shifted massively from a Biden +30 in 2020 to Harris +5 in 2024. Similarly, results in Asian communities in New Jersey and California look equally concerning for Democrats.
You always need to wait for precinct data to really figure out how Asians shifted (since there aren’t any exclusively or majority Asian counties) but it won’t be good for Democrats. Based on the initial county and district-level data, the shift toward Trump among working- and middle-class Asian voters is extreme, but even the shift among affluent Asians in the Bay Area looks like it will be a bit larger than the national average.
Florida Amendments Failure (Repro. Rights and Pot Go Down)
Since Florida is a bit of a second home state to me, I want to address Tuesday’s results, which have pushed Florida Democrats to the brink of political hopelessness. Democrats were wiped out across the state. It’s remarkable that, in just four years, Florida has shifted from a battleground where Biden was favored to win to a state with as conservative governance to anywhere in the country.
All of Florida’s liberal ballot amendments failed, including significant ones on abortion and marijuana legalization, leaving the state entirely in the hands of Republican lawmakers with virtually no checks and balances. In other red states, Democrats have had some success using constitutional amendments to pass popular liberal policies (most recently with Ohio voting in favor of marijuana and abortion in 2023 after preventing Republicans from raising the threshold for ballot issues to 60%). However, the challenge in Florida is the 60% supermajority requirement to pass amendments—a rule that ironically passed with just 57% simple majority support in 2006 as backlash against a ridiculous pregnant pigs amendment on the Florida ballot in 2002. This threshold ultimately stymied progressive measures that might have otherwise had strong public support.
Florida Republicans have recently discussed raising the amendment threshold even higher, which would effectively dismantle the citizen-initiated constitutional amendment process. Conversely, if Florida Democrats are smart, they should invest substantial resources into a 2026 amendment campaign to lower the threshold back to 50%. The 2026 midterms, likely to take place in a favorable environment for Democrats under a Trump administration, would be a uniquely good opportunity to get something like that passed.
If successful, Democrats could then follow Ohio Democrat’s approach by introducing amendments for issues like abortion and marijuana legalization only needing a simple majority—two major policy areas increasingly decided at the state level. However, if Democrats fail to get this threshold amendment on the ballot in 2026, or if it doesn’t pass, Florida liberals are pretty screwed. With heavily gerrymandered state House and Senate maps and a strong Republican tilt statewide, the pathway back to competitiveness would be severely obstructed.
Ticket-splitting
If you're a Democrat and think Tuesday was rough, you’re absolutely right. But it could have been much worse. Had Americans voted for Republicans in Congress at the same rate they voted for Donald Trump, the GOP would have secured 57 seats in the Senate and likely around 230 in the House—a commanding majority. Instead, the GOP will end up with around 53 seats in the Senate and 220–221 in the House. Expect to hear a lot more from moderate Republicans over the next two years. Trump will hold only the narrowest of trifectas, and no one can really predict what’s coming in the years ahead.
The GOP’s overperformance suggests one of three things: (1) Donald Trump is a strong candidate, (2) Kamala Harris is a weak candidate, or (3) Democrats generally overperform in down-ballot elections because they field better-funded, higher-quality candidates. Differentiating the first two through data is challenging since they’re interconnected, but both likely hold some truth. Trump clearly has a unique appeal among Hispanic voters, driving turnout for him, while Harris seems particularly weak with middle-class and affluent suburban voters, as well as less cosmopolitan white voters.
There are some striking results to consider. For example, Zach Nunn (super strong GOP moderate candidate) didn’t outperform Trump in Polk and Dallas counties, likely due to Harris’s unpopularity there. In New Hampshire, Harris trailed behind Goodlander and Pappas by 4.5% and particularly struggled in more educated areas—New Hampshire, one of the least Trump-friendly states, saw swing voters simply preferring anyone over Harris at the top of the ticket.
The third point also has some validity: Democrats notably outraised Republicans in competitive House races. Yet even in races like Michigan’s Senate contest, where funding and candidate quality were closely matched, Democrats still saw roughly a 2% down-ballot boost, underscoring overperformance across the ticket.
Final Prediction Review
I released my final predictions a couple of weeks ago, and I performed well (or, let’s say, got lucky) this year. I correctly predicted 49 out of 50 states in the presidential election, missing only Wisconsin, where I had picked Harris. Although she lost, it was her narrowest defeat among the seven battleground states, so I’ll take some comfort in that.
In the Senate, I went 33 for 34—no one would have reasonably predicted Casey’s loss. In the House, I look set to finish with around 423 correct out of 435, which I’m very pleased with. Some of my calls missed the mark (MT-01 and NE-02 flopped), but a few of my upset picks, like PA-10, WI-3, and CA-47, turned out to be closer than expected.
Overall, I got about 97% of the races right, as well as 6 out of 7 presidential battlegrounds and 10 out of 11 competitive Senate races. From a topline perspective I got within 10 electoral votes, 1 senate seat, and 3-4 seats in the US house.
2026 Senate Map
Democrats will need to flip North Carolina in 2026, but beyond that, viable pickup opportunities are scarce. It would be surprising if Collins loses in Maine; she’ll likely have plenty of chances to oppose Trump and build her credentials in his administration. As for other possibilities, three likely Republican states—Iowa, Kansas, and Ohio—will be up for grabs, with Ohio being the most promising.
Ohio could be winnable if the GOP nominee is anyone but Matt Dolan (considering Vance won a relatively close race in the Biden midterm). Sherrod Brown could even run if he chooses, but he’s 71 so I think there’s a pretty good chance he retires. These races would be competitive in a D+8 environment, like 2018, but without a strong Democratic wave, flipping any of these seats will be challenging. Realistically, Democrats might reach 52 seats at best—or 51 if they manage to unseat Collins.
Democratic Losses in Liberal States
It’s no surprise to me that Democratic losses were especially concentrated in liberal states. Abortion rights were the only major issue that played strongly in Democrats’ favor, so in states where abortion rights were already protected by liberal state governments, this issue was much less salient. Consequently, voters in these states shifted more toward Republicans, as Democrats' strongest issue held less sway.
International Elections
Some would say Democrats have been the best-performing incumbent party in a major economy since 2021. Macron’s party in France suffered major losses, Canadian Liberals are in a precarious position (about to get crushed), the UK’s Tories got destroyed, and even Modi’s party in India experienced setbacks. The economic strain from the 2021 COVID recovery has been challenging globally, and the U.S. isn’t the only country facing inflation issues. Incumbent parties worldwide are feeling the effects, and Democrats are actually doing better than most of them.